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THE “SCOURGE” OF ARMED CHECK FRAUD:




Prohibited possessor statutes have been a part of American law for decades. Put
simply, these laws prohibit any person who has been convicted of a felony from
possessing a firearm, a prohibition that lasts for the felon’s entire life. The Supreme
Court’s modern Second Amendment jurisprudence has held that the right to possess
a firearm is a fundamental individual right.  In light of this new paradigm, the
constitutionality of such broad prohibitions must be called into question—despite
the eagerness of courts across the country to dismiss such challenges by pointing to a
single line in Heller. This Note challenges the constitutionality of modern prohib-
ited possessor laws and asserts that these laws are unconstitutionally overbroad. It
then proposes a constitutional framework for analyzing laws that ban firearm pos-
session by felons.
INTRODUCTION
Prohibited possessor laws have existed in the United States for
decades. Many of these laws, which exist at both the federal and
state level, originally applied only to violent felons. Over time, how-
ever, these laws broadened in scope; today, virtually every person
convicted of a felony is automatically banned from possessing a fire-
arm. In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v.
Heller, holding for the first time that the Second Amendment pro-
tects an individual right to keep and bear arms.1 In McDonald v. City
of Chicago, the Court incorporated this right against the states,
counting “the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamen-
tal rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”2
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2018; B.A., Washington
University in St. Louis, 2015.  I would like to thank the editors of the Michigan Journal of Law
Reform for their hard work and dedication in editing my Note. I would also like to thank
Kevin Heade of the Maricopa County Office of the Public Defender, who assigned me a
project on prohibited possessor laws that inspired the writing of this Note.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
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One might expect the holdings in Heller and McDonald to have
had a dramatic impact on prohibited possessor laws. After all, pro-
hibited possessor laws bar a group of people from exercising a
fundamental right for their entire lives. Yet, challenges to prohib-
ited possessor laws have largely been unsuccessful. How can this be?
Part of the answer lies in Heller itself. In a brief and passing remark,
the Heller Court noted that the right to keep and bear arms is not
absolute: “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”3
Courts have relied on this language to dismiss challenges to prohib-
ited possessor laws.
Despite Heller’s language, current prohibited possessor laws do
not make sense in light of the Court’s modern Second Amendment
jurisprudence. Second Amendment restrictions must satisfy some
form of heightened scrutiny, and these laws are too broad to do so.
They cover a wide variety of offenses that have nothing to do with
firearms, and they cover an extensive range of offenders who can-
not be considered any more dangerous than the average person.
This Note provides a framework for analyzing the constitutional-
ity of prohibited possessor statutes. It recognizes a clear public
purpose served by keeping firearms away from those who pose a
danger to society while also recognizing that current laws are in-
credibly overbroad, creating irrational lifetime bans on firearm
possession by people who pose little danger to public safety. This
Note creates a framework that addresses both concerns; it adopts a
workable and easy-to-apply distinction between violent and non-vio-
lent felons, it makes room for laws that actually serve to keep society
safe, and it allows individuals to bring as-applied challenges to laws
that are irrational when applied to them.
Part I explains the background behind prohibited possessor laws
and the Court’s modern Second Amendment jurisprudence. Part II
explores the current state of the law and how courts across the
country have handled challenges to prohibited possessor statutes.
Part III lays out the reform—a framework for addressing the consti-
tutionality of prohibited possessor laws—and addresses
counterarguments.
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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I. BACKGROUND TO PROBIBITED POSSESSOR LAWS AND THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
Part I of this Note addresses the background of both Second
Amendment jurisprudence and prohibited possessor laws. It begins
with a brief description of these laws. Next, it gives an overview of
the Second Amendment, detailing how it came to protect an indi-
vidual right to bear arms and how that right was incorporated
against the states. Next, this Note discusses why the classification of
the Second Amendment right as “fundamental” implies the need to
analyze restrictions on the exercise of that right under heightened
scrutiny. It then provides a discussion of how the Supreme Court
has explicitly endorsed certain restrictions on the Second Amend-
ment right. This Note examines these restrictions and addresses the
challenges to the Supreme Court’s assertion that bans on felons
possessing firearms are “longstanding.” Part I concludes by discuss-
ing the problems created by attempting to apply strict scrutiny to
prohibited possessor laws as they currently exist.
A. Prohibited Possessor Laws
Prohibited possessor laws exist at both the federal and state
level.4 For the sake of simplicity, this Note focuses primarily on the
federal prohibition found in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it un-
lawful for any person
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce.5
References to state statutes may also be used throughout for illus-
tration or to provide further examples. Because states are not
burdened by the need to justify their legislation as an exercise of
the commerce power, their prohibited possessor statutes can cover
all firearms. For example, Arizona law makes it a crime for “any
person . . . [w]ho has been convicted within or without this state of
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012); see, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.1 (2017); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-131 (2011 & Supp. 2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3101, 02 (2010 & Supp.
2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 29800(a)(1) (West 2012).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
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a felony or who has been adjudicated delinquent for a felony and
whose civil right to possess or carry a gun or firearm has not been
restored”6 to possess a deadly weapon.7 Ultimately, the federal and
state prohibited possessor statutes tend to be very similar, and while
some states do have narrower prohibitions,8 the likelihood that any
given firearm has been shipped in interstate commerce means that
even felons in these more lenient states are likely to violate the fed-
eral prohibited possessor law.9
B. The Second Amendment Revolution
In 2008, the Supreme Court shook the legal landscape when it
announced District of Columbia v. Heller,10 which held for the first
time that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
keep and bear arms.11 Unsurprisingly, the decision did not craft a
fully developed body of jurisprudence. Instead, the Court explicitly
acknowledged that the contours of the right would be laid out in
later cases, explaining, “since this case represents this Court’s first
in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not
expect it to clarify the entire field.”12 While the Court later held
that the Second Amendment limited both states and the federal
government,13 a fully formed body of doctrine surrounding the Sec-
ond Amendment has not yet emerged.
The Second Amendment itself, like much of the Bill of Rights,
does not define the contours of the right it protects. The amend-
ment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”14 In addition to its broad scope, the
Second Amendment is confusingly drafted. Because Heller was de-
cided five-to-four and because the issues of gun rights, gun
violence, and gun control are hotly debated political topics, there is
a temptation to dismiss the Second Amendment as not protecting a
6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3101(A)(7)(b).
7. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A)(4).
8. For example, Texas only bars felons from keeping a firearm in the home for five
years, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West 2011), while New Hampshire limits the prohi-
bition to drug felonies and felonies against persons or property. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3
(2012).
9. The federal prohibition applies to firearms shipped in or affecting interstate com-
merce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
11. Id. at 595.
12. Id. at 635.
13. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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“real” right. As Justice Thomas has noted, “We treat no other consti-
tutional right so cavalierly.”15
C. Prohibited Possessor Laws and the Second Amendment
Until Heller, there was little reason to analyze prohibited posses-
sor statutes across the country. The Second Amendment was little
regarded, rarely cited, and generally ignored.16 To the extent that
courts addressed it, they dismissed the argument that it protected
an individual right to bear arms,17 usually by relying on United States
v. Miller, which held that firearm possession was only constitution-
ally protected if it bore “some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”18 Conse-
quently, the answer to the question “do prohibited possessor
statutes violate the Second Amendment” was simple: no.
Heller complicated the issue. To the extent that courts prior to
Heller upheld prohibited possessor statutes on the grounds that
there was no individual right to possess a firearm, the validity of
those decisions is now doubtful. More generally, and more impor-
tantly, any law that infringes on an individual’s right to possess a
firearm must now be examined critically, as it implicates a constitu-
tionally protected right.
While the temptation to simply ignore Heller might be enticing to
those who disagree with its holding (for either legal or political rea-
sons), it would be patently untenable to do so. Unless the Supreme
Court overturns Heller, all parties must recognize that “the Second
Amendment confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms,”19
and that “the inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the Sec-
ond Amendment right.”20 Thus, in a post-Heller world, the Second
Amendment cannot be ignored, and challenges to restrictions on
15. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2291 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 638–40
(1989).
17. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 150–51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550
(4th Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms).
18. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). But see District of Colombia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (“[Miller] is not only consistent with, but positively suggests,
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only
arms that ‘have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia’).”).
19. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, at 595.
20. Id. at 628.
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firearm ownership must be treated as seriously as challenges to re-
strictions on any other constitutional right.
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court decided McDonald v.
City of Chicago, incorporating the Second Amendment against the
states. The Court held that “the right to keep and bear arms [is]
among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered
liberty.”21 The language of “fundamental rights” necessary to a “sys-
tem of ordered liberty” is commonly used to incorporate provisions
of the Bill of Rights.22 However, it cannot simply be dismissed as the
boilerplate language of incorporation. Words have meaning, and
the Supreme Court has not been silent about how courts protect
fundamental rights. Typically, rights that are deemed “fundamen-
tal” are subject to strict scrutiny,23 which makes restrictions on those
rights possible, but difficult to justify. Indeed, Justice Thurgood
Marshall once wrote that strict scrutiny is often “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.”24 But while it is difficult to uphold a restriction under
strict scrutiny, it is not impossible.25 Under strict scrutiny, “[w]here
certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compel-
ling state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
21. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
22. Compare id. (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms [is] among those fundamental
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”), with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
149 n.14 (1968) (“The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular proce-
dure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty.”) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury
against the states).
23. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”); Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (“[A] statute provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ be-
cause it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’ . . . .”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17
(1982) (“Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvan-
tage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’ With
respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by
requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.”) (footnotes omitted); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (“Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual
system of financing education could not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court
has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental
constitutional rights . . . .”) (footnote omitted). But see United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673,
682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“We do not apply strict scrutiny whenever a law impinges upon a right
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”).
24. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
25. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”26 To
this day, this remains the test for strict scrutiny.
D. Limits on the Right to Bear Arms
When the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment pro-
tects an individual right to keep and bear arms, it was careful to
note that it is not an unlimited right. Like all constitutional rights,
it is subject to some restrictions. The Court made this point explicit,
stating that the Second Amendment “was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.”27 Rather, the Court explained that certain limi-
tations were “presumptively lawful,” stating that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-
standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.”28
The very first of these exemptions—prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons—is the subject of this Note. This portion of
the opinion is peculiar because, as Justice Breyer’s dissent notes, it
fails to support its claim that these prohibitions are “longstand-
ing.”29 This omission is especially odd because the rest of the
opinion relies so heavily on historical sources.
Indeed, the evidence that these prohibitions are longstanding is
subject to debate.30 When faced with challenges to prohibited pos-
sessor statutes, courts quickly discover that “[f]ederal felon
dispossession laws . . . were not on the books until the twentieth
century, and the historical evidence and scholarly writing on
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (internal citations omitted); see also Burson,
504 U.S. at 199 (“To survive strict scrutiny, however, a State must do more than assert a
compelling state interest—it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted
interest.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ This means that
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests.”) (internal citations omitted).
27. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
28. Id. at 626–27.
29. See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. See Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by Nonviolent
Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 127 (2013).
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whether felons were protected by the Second Amendment at the
time of its ratification is inconclusive.”31 To this day, “scholars con-
tinue to debate the evidence of historical precedent for prohibiting
criminals from carrying arms.”32 In fact, the Second Militia Act of
1792 required every “free able-bodied white male citizen” between
eighteen and forty-five years of age to obtain a firearm.33 This man-
date to purchase a firearm lacked a carved-out exemption for
felons.
The history of prohibited possessor statutes belies the assump-
tion that felons have always been categorically banned from
possessing firearms. Indeed, the original federal prohibition, the
Federal Firearms Act of 1938, only applied to felons “convicted of a
crime of violence.”34 However, as part of a general trend towards
“tough on crime” legislation, the prohibition was expanded to all
felons in 1961.35 Congress expanded the prohibition in response to
the perceived “infiltration of racketeering into [ ] society and the
exploding crime rate [that had] increasingly become a cause for
national concern.”36 According to the bill’s supporters, “New laws
are needed so the Federal Government can better assist local au-
thorities in the common assault against crime.”37 Similarly,
Arizona’s original prohibited possessor statute prohibited any per-
son convicted of a “crime of violence” from possessing a pistol, with
a crime of violence defined as “murder, manslaughter with a dan-
gerous weapon or implement other than an automobile, assault
with a dangerous weapon, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, bur-
glary or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.”38 Like the federal statute,
Arizona’s prohibited possessor law was later rewritten to prohibit
any person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.39
Finally, the Court’s fleeting discussion of bans on felons possess-
ing firearms seems to implicitly contradict its later holding that
firearm possession is a “fundamental right.” As Alexander Barrett
31. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
32. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
33. Kahn, supra note 30, at 127 (internal citations omitted) (citing Militia Act of 1792,
ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271); See also Nordyke v. King, 364 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
dissenting).
34. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943); Kahn, supra note 30, at 116 (internal
quotations omitted).
35. Kahn, supra note 30, at 116.
36. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1202, at 3068 (1961).
37. Id.
38. State v. Harmon, 541 P.2d 600, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
39. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws. 766 (enacting the original version of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-3101-02 (2010 & Supp. 2016)).
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explained in his note Taking Aim at Felony Possession, “the limitations
the majority endorsed would be difficult to reconcile with the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny . . . gun control regulations would have
serious difficulties meeting strict scrutiny’s requirement that a law
be narrowly tailored to achieve its ends.”40 Barrett is correct; strict
scrutiny is designed to avoid the kind of overbreadth that prohibited
possessor statutes create. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a re-
striction on firearm possession that is less narrowly tailored. In his
Heller dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the constitutionality of these
bans under strict scrutiny “would be far from clear,” and he criti-
cized the majority for not giving lower courts guidance on how to
analyze Second Amendment cases.41
The “presumptively lawful” language of Heller and the fact that
firearm possession is a “fundamental right” creates a problem.
Given the Second Amendment’s protection of the fundamental
right to keep and bear arms, can the “presumptively lawful” lan-
guage in Heller be interpreted consistently with McDonald, or must
the language in Heller be neutralized in some way? This Note at-
tempts to solve this dilemma while also providing a workable legal
framework that distinguishes between those criminals who can be
constitutionally barred from firearm possession and those who can-
not be so restricted.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
The second part of this Note explores the current state of the law
regarding prohibited possessor statutes while critically examining
the manner in which courts have dealt with these laws in light of
Heller. It begins with an overview of how courts currently analyze
Second Amendment claims, before turning to a discussion of how
federal courts have used the Heller language to dismiss facial chal-
lenges to prohibited possessor laws. The part briefly questions these
determinations before turning to an important circuit split con-
cerning whether felons may bring as-applied challenges to
prohibited possessor laws.
40. Alexander C. Barrett, Note, Taking Aim at Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 174
(2013) (footnotes omitted).
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. Analyzing a Fundamental Right
When analyzing constitutional rights, courts use different stan-
dards of review. Depending on the standard used, the government
may have an easy or difficult time justifying an infringement on a
constitutional right. In general, laws may be subject to government-
friendly rational-basis review, or to the much higher burden of
strict scrutiny. Other constitutional rights are analyzed under inter-
mediate scrutiny, which falls between these two extremes. Courts
have declined to settle on one standard of review for Second
Amendment claims. Instead, they analyze cases based on the nature
of the restriction or regulation in question. For example, the
Fourth Circuit has written:
The Second Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-
fits-all standard of review than any other constitutional right.
Gun-control regulations impose varying degrees of burden on
Second Amendment rights, and individual assertions of the
right will come in many forms. A severe burden on the core
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense should re-
quire strong justification. But less severe burdens on the right,
laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and laws that do
not implicate the central self-defense concern of the Second
Amendment, may be more easily justified.42
In short, under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, laws that implicate
the Second Amendment are subject to different standards of scru-
tiny depending on their nature and restrictiveness. Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has held that “for gun laws that do not severely bur-
den the core Second Amendment right of self-defense there need
only be a ‘reasonable fit’ between an important governmental end
and the regulatory means chosen by the government to serve that
end.”43 For example, a law banning firearms entirely would be sub-
ject to higher scrutiny than a law requiring firearms to have serial
numbers.44
It would seem obvious given this classification system that prohib-
ited possessor statutes would be subject to strict scrutiny. In Heller,
the Court noted that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have
come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun
42. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010)).
43. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 814.
44. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
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ban,”45 which placed it “at the far end of the spectrum of infringe-
ment on protected Second Amendment rights.”46 Presumably, such
a restrictive law should be subject to strict scrutiny because it im-
poses a “severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of
armed self-defense.”47 Prohibited possessor statutes are at least as
restrictive as the handgun ban, imposing a lifetime ban on any felon
possessing any firearm.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny and the Second Amendment
Despite the restrictiveness of these laws, lower courts have deter-
mined that prohibited possessor statutes should be subject to
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. For example, in United
States v. Chester,48 the Fourth Circuit determined that Chester’s
claim is not within the core right identified in Heller—the right
of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a
weapon for self-defense—by virtue of Chester’s criminal his-
tory as a domestic violence misdemeanant. Accordingly, we
conclude that intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate than
strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated persons.49
While the Seventh Circuit suggested that the distinction between
intermediate and strict scrutiny rested on the severity of the restric-
tion,50 Chester focused on the importance of the “core right”
protected by the Second Amendment, which is the right of law-abid-
ing citizens to use firearms for self-defense. Because felons are, by
definition, not law-abiding citizens, their right to keep and bear
arms cannot be part of the core right protected by the Second
Amendment. Instead, felons have a lesser interest that is adjudi-
cated under intermediate scrutiny.
The exact definition of intermediate scrutiny is elusive. The Su-
preme Court has described it as “requir[ing] the asserted
governmental end to be more than just legitimate, either ‘signifi-
cant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important’ . . . and requir[ing] the fit
between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be
45. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
46. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.
47. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (quoting Skoien, 587 F.3d at 813).
48. 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).
49. Id. at 683.
50. See supra notes 42–43.
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reasonable, not perfect.”51 As a form of heightened scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny is more demanding than rational-basis review, but
less stringent than strict scrutiny, which requires that a restriction
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.52
C. Looking to the First Amendment
Because Heller is a recent decision, there has not been enough
time for a substantial body of law to develop around the Second
Amendment. Consequently, a number of courts have looked to
First Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing Second Amend-
ment claims after Heller. For example, in United States v. Marzzarella,
the Third Circuit ruled that “[b]ecause Heller is the first Supreme
Court case addressing the scope of the individual right to bear
arms, we look to other constitutional areas for guidance in evaluat-
ing Second Amendment challenges. We think the First Amend-
ment is the natural choice.”53 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has
stated, “we agree with those who advocate looking to the First
Amendment as a guide in developing a standard of review for the
Second Amendment.”54 Over the past seventy years, courts across
the country have developed an extensive body of First Amendment
jurisprudence.55 Like the Second Amendment, the First Amend-
ment protects a fundamental individual right; it was one of the
earliest Constitutional protections to be held binding on the
states.56 Thus, it is useful to look to First Amendment jurisprudence
because courts across the country have already begun to do so when
interpreting the Second Amendment. In sum, there are two reasons
to analyze the First Amendment in this piece: the two amendments
are similar, and courts across the country have already decided to
do so.
51. Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480–81 (1989)).
52. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
53. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit
reasoned that because Heller frequently invoked the First Amendment by way of analogy, it
was appropriate to use First Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing the Second Amend-
ment. Id.
54. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682.
55. See generally 1 WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, B.J. GEORGE, JR., & TIMOTHY M. TYMKOVICH,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMENTS: CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
¶?5A.01–.07 (Matthew Bender).
56. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the
press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
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In First Amendment jurisprudence, all three types of judicial
scrutiny are utilized. The most prominent First Amendment cases
are those involving content-based speech restrictions—for example,
laws that criminalize hate speech or anti-American speech. These
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has
held that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it
must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Govern-
ment’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”57 Such
laws are almost always struck down as violations of the First
Amendment.58
Other First Amendment cases do not warrant heightened scru-
tiny at all. The First Amendment “restricts government regulation
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”59 Con-
sequently, the government cannot violate the First Amendment
when it speaks on its own behalf, and any law regulating govern-
ment speech is subject to nothing more than rational-basis review—
the standard under which all laws not warranting heightened scru-
tiny are reviewed.
Content-neutral speech restrictions fall somewhere in the mid-
dle. These restrictions, which often involve limitations on the time,
place, and manner of speech, must be “narrowly tailored to serve
the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests.”60 This is a
form of intermediate scrutiny. It is more demanding than rational-
basis review but less stringent than strict scrutiny, which requires
that the interest be compelling, rather than merely legitimate. In
2014, the Supreme Court decided McCullen v. Coakley.61 The McCul-
len Court unanimously struck down a law prohibiting any person—
with a few exceptions62—from entering a thirty-five-foot “buffer
zone” around abortion clinics, holding that it was not narrowly tai-
lored to the state’s interest in maintaining access to those clinics.
Although the Court held that the law was content-neutral, and
57. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (internal citations
omitted).
58. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394–96 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a
law that banned fighting words “communicat[ing] messages of racial, gender, or religious
intolerance,” but not other fighting words); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional a law that banned flag-burning). But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992) (holding that a law banning political speech within 100 feet of a polling place on
election day satisfied strict scrutiny).
59. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
60. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
61. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
62. The exempt persons were people entering or leaving the clinic, employees of the
clinic, law enforcement and other city employees, and people using the sidewalk to reach a
destination other than the clinic. Id. at 2526.
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therefore not subject to strict scrutiny,63 the Court still noted that
“the Act is truly exceptional: Respondents and their amici identify
no other State with a law that creates fixed buffer zones around
abortion clinics.”64
A thirty-five-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics is certainly a
broad restriction, but even that regulation is narrow when com-
pared to a lifetime, categorical ban on gun ownership. While it is
true that the Court in McCullen never explicitly declared that it was
using intermediate scrutiny, it did use the standard for intermedi-
ate scrutiny, requiring that restrictions be “narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion.”65 Given the shared level of scrutiny between content-neutral
speech restrictions and firearm restrictions, both should be ana-
lyzed in the same manner.
D. Dismissing Challenges to “Presumptively Lawful” Statutes
Heller’s statement that prohibited possessor laws are “presump-
tively lawful” relies upon the questionable assumption that such
prohibitions are longstanding.66 Nonetheless, courts across the
country have uniformly used it to dismiss Second Amendment chal-
lenges to prohibited possessor laws. Even courts that are
sympathetic to these constitutional claims believe themselves bound
by precedent: the Ninth Circuit has conceded that “there may be
some good reasons to be skeptical about the correctness of the cur-
rent framework of analyzing the Second Amendment rights of
felons. But in light of Heller . . . those issues are beside the point
here.”67 Every circuit court except the Federal Circuit has held that
Heller’s language that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons” is binding precedent.68
63. Id. at 2534.
64. Id. at 2537.
65. Id. at 2529 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791) (internal quotations omitted).
66. See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text (discussing modern challenges to the
view that prohibited possessor laws are longstanding).
67. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2016).
68. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008); see United States v. Bogle,
717 F.3d 281, 281 (2d Cir. 2013); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United
States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d
110, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rozier,
598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.
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These courts have found that Heller’s “presumptively lawful” lan-
guage is an essential part of the holding. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has stated that “[c]ourts often limit the scope of their hold-
ings, and such limitations are integral to those holdings. Indeed,
‘[l]egal rulings in a prior opinion are applicable to future cases
only to the degree one can ascertain from the opinion itself the
reach of the ruling.’”69 In other words, Heller did more than simply
establish that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right
to keep and bear arms; it also recognized that the right has limits.
According to this interpretation, both parts are vital to the holding,
and the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that
Heller’s language regarding “presumptively lawful” restrictions is es-
sential to establishing the outer limits of the right.
There is one central problem with the reasoning of these courts:
a statement about the constitutionality of prohibited possessor stat-
utes cannot be essential to the holding of a case without a felon.70
Dick Heller was a special police officer, not a felon, and it is diffi-
cult to argue that the constitutionality of prohibited possessor laws
is essential to determine the outcome of his case. While the Ninth
Circuit persuasively argues that limitations on rights can be part of
a holding, prohibited possessor laws are simply irrelevant to the
facts of Heller. Heller was not a felon, and he did not challenge a law
that prohibited felons from possessing firearms. Thus, it cannot be
argued that the constitutional status of prohibited possessor laws is
an essential element of resolving Heller.
E. A Debate over “Presumptively” Lawful Bans
There is another issue raised by Heller’s “presumptively lawful”
language. If a ban is presumptively lawful, there must be a scenario in
which it is unlawful; otherwise, the use of “presumptively” would be
superfluous. The Seventh Circuit has held exactly that: “Heller re-
ferred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’
2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. An-
derson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).
69. Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 614 (9th Cir.
2008)).
70. Consider Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of obiter dictum: “[a] judicial comment
made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
case and therefore not precedential.” Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004);
see also Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959
(2005). Because the plaintiff in Heller was not a felon, the Supreme Court could have decided
the case and reached precisely the same result without ever discussing felons. Thus, the dis-
cussion of felons was not essential to the holding of the case.
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which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility
that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied
challenge.”71 While one could argue that “presumptively” was sim-
ply a recognition that the Court was not yet addressing the issue,
twelve circuits have held it to be part of Heller’s binding prece-
dent.72 However, as previously discussed, Heller cannot truly speak
on the subject of prohibited possessor laws, and this Note will
demonstrate why these laws should not be held “presumptively
lawful.”
Not all circuits rely on the “presumptively lawful” language to dis-
miss challenges to prohibited possessor laws. One important aspect
of Heller’s historical analysis was the Second Amendment’s focus on
the duty of a virtuous citizenry to protect the nation. Thus, the
amendment covers the right of “law-abiding citizens” to carry weap-
ons typically possessed “for lawful purposes.”73 It also means,
according to some courts, that the right only protects law-abiding
citizens. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that “felons are
categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental
right to bear arms,” meaning that felons are not protected by the
Second Amendment—and that prohibited possessor laws do not
implicate Heller at all.74 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has held that
“[i]rrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon
has shown manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not
justly complain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession
of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow citi-
zens.”75 The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Heller’s “presumptively
lawful” language as “suggest[ing] that statutes disqualifying felons
from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not
offend the Second Amendment.”76 Similarly, the Third Circuit has
held that although some misdemeanor crimes might not warrant a
categorical ban, “The category of ‘unvirtuous citizens’ is thus
broader than violent criminals; it covers any person who has com-
mitted a serious criminal offense, violent or non-violent.”77 For
decades, this view was considered historically sound; for example,
in 1983 Don Kates wrote that at the time of the founding, “Felons
simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law right to
71. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
72. See supra note 68.
73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
74. Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115.
75. United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004).
76. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010).
77. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016).
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possess arms.”78 However, in recent decades new scholarship on the
original meaning of the Second Amendment has challenged this
view, and the debate regarding the historical basis for these bans
rages on.79
The Seventh Circuit disagrees with these circuits on another cru-
cial point, arguing that Heller ought to be read narrowly. While
leaving open the possibility that the Second Amendment might
protect some felons,80 the Seventh Circuit also warned against using
the Heller language to decide prohibited possessor cases:
“We do not think it profitable to parse these passages of Heller
as if they contained an answer to the question whether [the
federal prohibited possessor law] is valid . . . . [Supreme
Court] Justices have told us . . . not to treat Heller as containing
broader holdings than the Court set out to establish: that the
Second Amendment creates individual rights, one of which is
keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense. What
other entitlements the Second Amendment creates, and what
regulations legislatures may establish, were left open.”81
Of course, courts across the country have overwhelmingly ignored
this advice, instead citing to Heller’s brief discussion of the issue as
binding precedent.82
Even if we ignore the Seventh Circuit’s warning and treat the
language in Heller as binding, the rulings of the Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits are perplexing. If bans on gun possession by
felons fail to implicate the Second Amendment, why are those bans
only presumptively lawful? If Heller meant to assert that prohibited
possessor statutes were always constitutional, it would have said so.
The Third Circuit at least makes logical sense of Heller’s language
by acknowledging that some prohibited possessor statutes might be
unconstitutional.83
The lower courts have disagreed about how to interpret Heller’s
assertion that it does not cast doubt on “presumptively lawful” bans
on felons possessing firearms. While all courts to address the issue
have determined that this language precludes facial challenges to
78. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983).
79. See discussion supra notes 30–33.
80. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
81. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
82. See supra note 68 (listing the circuits that have cited the Heller language as binding
precedent).
83. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying a framework
for deciding as-applied challenges to prohibited possessor laws).
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prohibited possessor laws,84 they have disagreed about whether an
as-applied challenge could succeed. Some courts have interpreted
Heller as holding that prohibited possessor statutes can never violate
the Second Amendment, while other courts have held that there
may be cases in which these laws are so irrational that they violate
the Constitution. Part III takes a side in this debate and formulates
a rational framework for analyzing prohibited possessor laws.
III. MAKING PROHIBITED POSSESSOR LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL
The final part of this Note proposes a reform that allows states to
satisfy their legitimate interest in preventing dangerous criminals
from possessing firearms without running afoul of the Second
Amendment. The reform has three parts:
1) prohibitions on firearm possession by felons should be sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny;
2) prohibitions on violent felons possessing firearms should
presumptively satisfy intermediate scrutiny;
3) violent felons should be able to bring as-applied challenges
to prohibited possessor laws.85
This part begins by using existing law to delineate the distinction
between violent and non-violent felonies. It demonstrates the irra-
tionality of the blanket ban on firearm possession by all felons and
criticizes the universal application of the ban to non-violent felons.
Next, it discusses why bans on firearm possession by violent felons
are presumptively valid. Finally, it concludes by arguing that violent
felons should be able to bring as-applied challenges, since there are
some violent felons for whom a lifetime ban on firearm possession
is also irrational.
A. Defining Violent Felonies
A violent felony is one that constitutes a crime of violence, which
is defined under federal law as:
84. See cases cited supra note 68.
85. See Williams, 616 F.3d at 692 (noting that “there must exist the possibility that the
ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as applied challenge”).
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a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.86
This statute, and statutes like it, have engendered controversy in
recent years. Subsection (b) has been challenged on the grounds
that it is void for vagueness,87 following a Supreme Court decision
holding that a similar part of the Armed Career Criminal Act was
unconstitutional.88 At the time of writing, the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear the case.89 However, these challenges do not impli-
cate subsection (a), which remains a sensible approach for defining
violent crimes. Thus, prohibited possessor laws should define a
crime of violence as a crime that has “the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another.”90 Although some attempts to specifically delineate violent
crimes have encountered difficulty,91 defining violent felonies as all
felonies involving the use or threat of physical force presents a far
more manageable standard than one in which violent felonies must
be specifically delineated.92
B. Current Bans Fail Intermediate Scrutiny
Without question, the government has a compelling interest in
keeping firearms out of the hands of those who would use them to
commit acts of violence. However, the existence of the Second
Amendment limits what the government may do to pursue that
goal. As the Heller Court noted, “the enshrinement of constitutional
86. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
87. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
Technically, the challenge is to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012), which incorporates 18
U.S.C. 16’s definition of crime of violence.
88. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding that “conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” in the Armed Career Criminal
Act’s “residual clause” was void for vagueness).
89. Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
91. Jazmine Ulloa, What Is a ‘Violent Crime’? For California’s New Parole Law, the Definition Is
Murky—and It Matters, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/polit-
ics/la-pol-sac-proposition-57-violent-crime-list-20170127-story.html.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
428 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”93 A life-
time ban on firearm possession is the most restrictive infringement
possible, in some ways even more so than the ban in Heller, which
only applied to Washington, D.C.—at least a person could leave the
District of Columbia. By contrast, the federal prohibited possessor
law applies to felons throughout the nation.
Bans on firearm possession by felons should be subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny,94 and prohibited possessor statutes as currently
formulated do not survive under that standard. These statutes are
illogical when applied across-the-board to non-violent felons. Pro-
hibited possessor laws typically bar all convicted felons from using
or possessing a firearm, even though there are a plethora of non-
violent felonies, including felonies that have no connection to fire-
arms. To use two examples from Arizona: it is a felony to knowingly
drop over 300 pounds of litter on public property,95 and it is also a
felony to write bad checks “in an amount of five thousand dollars or
more” without paying back the money within sixty days of receiving
notice.96 What public safety interest could possibly justify banning
the possession of guns by people who drop 301 pounds of litter?
More absurdly, why are people who drop 301 pounds of litter a dan-
ger to society who must be kept away from firearms, but people who
drop 299 pounds of litter are not? Similarly, while there are cer-
tainly felons who pose a danger to the public, and who would pose
an even greater danger if armed, it is difficult to seriously believe
that people who write bad checks categorically fall into that group.
And again, there is an entirely arbitrary distinction separating those
who can possess firearms from those who are barred for life: was the
fraudulent check written for $4,999 or $5,000?
Not only are these crimes non-violent, they also defy attempts to
relate them to firearms in any way. While a person could hypotheti-
cally litter while brandishing a firearm, it is difficult to see how the
firearm might make the crime more dangerous, and it is even more
difficult to imagine why firearm usage transforms only mass-litter-
ing, and not petty-littering, into a dangerous crime. Of course, the
danger of armed littering seems downright banal when compared
to that other great scourge of the American polity: armed check
93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
94. Cf. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e believe his
claim is not within the core right identified in Heller—the right of a law-abiding, responsible
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that
intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situ-
ated persons.”).
95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1603(B)(1) (Supp. 2016).
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1807(E) (2010).
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fraud. If there is some reason why a fraudster writing a bad check
while seated at a barren desk is less of a danger to public safety than
a fraudster who writes at a desk furnished with firearms, it eludes
the author of this Note. And again, why is the firearm possession
only a danger if the check is for an amount over $5,000? Clearly,
laws barring these felons from possessing firearms restrict the right
to keep and bear arms substantially more than is necessary to serve
the government’s interest of keeping guns out of the hands of those
who threaten public safety.
But what of the question of bad moral character: are people who
commit any kind of crime inherently more dangerous? In some
sense, they are. After all, the United States has extremely high re-
cidivism rates.97 However, even accepting that people who have
previously committed crimes might be more likely to commit
crimes again does not imply that those crimes will be dangerous, or
that those crimes might be made dangerous by the presence of fire-
arms. Because the Second Amendment protects a fundamental
constitutional right, the justification for a universal ban must be sig-
nificantly more potent.
This is not to say that all non-violent felons should be legally al-
lowed to possess firearms. There are non-violent felonies that could
be made more dangerous with the presence of firearms,98 and there
are non-violent felonies that could serve as “gateway” crimes to
more serious offenses. In addition to my proposed narrowing of
existing prohibited possessor statutes, legislatures could pass other
laws banning firearm possession from people convicted of certain
non-violent felonies if the restrictions are substantially related to an
important government interest.99 For example, given the dangers of
97. See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO
2010 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf.
98. A transaction for an illicit substance is the quintessential example of a non-violent
felony made more dangerous by the presence of a firearm. See, e.g., Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993) (“When Congress enacted the current version of § 924(c)(1), it was
no doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination. In 1989, [fifty-six] percent
of all murders in New York City were drug related; during the same period, the figure for the
Nation’s Capital was as high as [eighty] percent. The fact that a gun is treated momentarily as
an item of commerce does not render it inert or deprive it of destructive capacity. Rather, as
experience demonstrates, it can be converted instantaneously from currency to cannon.”)
(internal citations omitted); United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We
can also speculate as to what purpose a prohibition on carrying a gun during and in relation
to a violent or drug trafficking crime might serve. Using or carrying guns makes those crimes
more dangerous. A drug dealer who packs heat is more likely to hurt someone or provoke
someone else to violence.”) (footnotes omitted).
99. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (defining inter-
mediate scrutiny in the context of gender discrimination).
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organized crime, it would be reasonable for a legislature to ban fire-
arm possession by people convicted of trafficking large amounts of
drugs. However, because firearm possession is protected as a funda-
mental right, these laws must be tailored to satisfy intermediate
scrutiny.
C. “Law-Abiding Citizens” and the Second Amendment
It is sometimes argued that the Second Amendment only pro-
tects law-abiding citizens and is therefore simply irrelevant to
discussions of prohibited possessor laws.100 Admittedly, “law-abiding
citizens” is a phrase often used in Heller. However, the words “law-
abiding” do not appear in the Second Amendment. Instead, the
right is reserved to “the people.”101 Basic principles of legal inter-
pretation would suggest that the meaning of “the people” should be
the same throughout the Constitution, and particularly throughout
the Bill of Rights. After all, the Amendments were drafted at the
same time. The phrase “the people” appears twice in the original
Constitution, and five times in the Bill of Rights. Two amendments
are most important for our purposes: the First Amendment protects
“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances,”102 while the Fourth
Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”103 Notably, neither
protection guaranteed to “the people” in the Bill of Rights is cate-
gorically barred to felons, a fact that Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in Heller.104 The argument that felons are not included as
part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment proves
100. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We recognize
the phrase ‘presumptively lawful’ could have different meanings under newly enunciated
Second Amendment doctrine. On the one hand, this language could be read to suggest the
identified restrictions are presumptively lawful because they regulate conduct outside the
scope of the Second Amendment. On the other hand, it may suggest the restrictions are
presumptively lawful because they pass muster under any standard of scrutiny. Both readings
are reasonable interpretations, but we think the better reading, based on the text and the
structure of Heller, is the former—in other words, that these longstanding limitations are
exceptions to the right to bear arms.”) (footnote omitted); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 414 (2009) (“The
Court’s approval of ‘prohibitions,’ rather than regulations, confirms that felons and the men-
tally ill, however defined, are excluded entirely from Second Amendment coverage.”).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
104. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 644 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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too much; such an argument would logically have to extend to the
Fourth Amendment as well. To say that criminal defendants with
prior felony convictions have no Fourth Amendment rights would
shake the very foundations of the criminal justice system; only those
with clean records would be protected from unreasonable searches
and seizures, or be able to exclude illegally-obtained evidence from
trial. This cannot be correct—and it is most assuredly not in line
with modern doctrine.105
D. A Ban on Violent Felons Possessing Firearms Is Presumptively
Constitutional. . .
We turn now to the second and third parts of this reform. There
is an obvious government interest in keeping firearms out of the
hands of those who would use them to commit acts of violence.
This is a legitimate interest, and a ban on firearm possession by
those convicted of violent felonies is narrowly tailored to serve that
end.106 There are compelling reasons to believe that those who have
committed violent crimes in the past might commit violent crimes
again. According to the Department of Justice, nearly one-third of
all violent criminals are re-arrested within five years for another vio-
lent crime.107 There is a substantial government interest in
preventing those violent crimes from being aggravated by the use of
firearms. Thus, prohibited possessor laws that only apply to those
convicted of violent felonies are presumptively constitutional.
E. . . . But that Ban Should Be Subject to As-Applied Challenges
As a general matter, restrictions on firearm possession by violent
felons should be upheld. However, this alone does not ensure that
Second Amendment rights will be adequately protected. While the
majority of violent felons may be constitutionally prohibited from
105. It is true that one usage of “the people” in the Constitution (“The House of Repre-
sentatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the
several States . . . .”) can be restricted to non-felons. Under current law, states are permitted
to strip felons of the right to vote. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974). However, this decision relied on particular language in the Fourteenth
Amendment related to voting. Thus, it is completely inapplicable to firearm possession.
106. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–800 (1989) (defining intermedi-
ate scrutiny in the context of the First Amendment).
107. DUROSE ET AL, supra note 97, at 9 (“Within the first 5 years of release from state
prison in 2005, an estimated 28.6% of inmates were arrested for a violent offense.”) (citation
omitted).
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possessing firearms, there are also people convicted of violent
crimes who nevertheless pose little danger to society and to whom it
would be wholly irrational to bar firearm possession for life.108 In
order to be consistent with the Second Amendment, these prohibi-
tions must allow individuals to bring as-applied challenges in cases
where a ban on their possession of firearms would be irrational.
As-applied challenges have a number of advantages over facial
challenges. In an as-applied challenge, “the plaintiff argues that a
statute, even though generally constitutional, operates unconstitu-
tionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff’s particular
circumstances.”109 Courts are often hesitant to strike down laws
based on facial challenges, and the Supreme Court has explained
this hesitation by reasoning:
Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a conse-
quence, they raise the risk of ‘premature interpretation of
statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.’ Facial
challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of
judicial restraint that courts should neither ‘anticipate a ques-
tion of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it’ nor ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be ap-
plied.’ Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of
the people from being implemented in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. We must keep in mind that ‘a ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people.’110
An as-applied challenge avoids these problems by not forcing a
court to strike down the law in question, and by not forcing a court
to consider whether “no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid.”111 Instead, an as-applied challenge allows a
court to look at a particular record, judge a case on its own merits,
and vindicate the constitutional rights of a wronged party without
making broad judgments that affect the legal landscape as a whole.
108. See, e.g., infra note 112 and accompanying text.
109. Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 657, 657 (2010) (quoting Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518
(Tex. 1995)).
110. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008)
(citations omitted).
111. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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For an example of a case that could involve a successful as-ap-
plied challenge, consider Schrader v. Holder.112 In 1968, Schrader,
then a twenty-year-old member of the Navy in Maryland, encoun-
tered a gang member who had allegedly assaulted him a week prior.
An altercation occurred, during which Schrader punched the other
combatant. For this, he was convicted of common-law misdemeanor
assault and battery, resulting in a fine of one hundred dollars.
Schrader did not spend any time in jail, and he received an honora-
ble discharge from the Navy after serving a tour in Vietnam. Other
than a single traffic violation, Schrader had no subsequent en-
counters with the law.113
The federal prohibited possessor statute bans firearm possession
by any person “who has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”114 but
not including “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as
a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two
years or less.”115 The operative word is punishable; the actual sen-
tence imposed is irrelevant—what matters is the maximum
sentence allowed by law.116 In Schrader, the court first noted that at
the time of his conviction, Schrader’s crime had no statutory pen-
alty.117 Under Maryland law at the time, “The maximum term of
imprisonment was ordinarily limited only by the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Articles 16 and 25 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”118 Furthermore, nothing
about common-law crimes suggested they were not susceptible to
long prison sentences. To the contrary, attempted murder and at-
tempted rape were both common-law misdemeanors that did not
carry a statutory sentence, and common-law misdemeanor assault
and battery covered virtually every form of assault.119 Clearly, these
were crimes that could—and often did—result in prison sentences
that far exceeded two years. Thus, the Schrader court reasoned that
common-law misdemeanor assault and battery was a crime punisha-
ble by more than two years imprisonment, placing it within the
112. Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
113. Id. at 983.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B) (2012).
116. See Schrader, 704 F.3d at 985–86. See also United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199,
203–04 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir.
1993).
117. Schrader, 704 F.3d at 983.
118. Robinson v. State, 728 A.2d 698, 702 n.6 (1999).
119. Schrader, 704 F.3d at 985.
434 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
restriction set by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and outside of the excep-
tion allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).120 This was, of
course, in spite of the fact that Schrader had only been fined one
hundred dollars and did not spend a moment incarcerated.121
Considering Schrader’s honorable military service and his forty-
five years spent as a law-abiding citizen,122 it is implausible to argue
that his felony conviction proves he is a danger to society. Interme-
diate scrutiny requires that the government’s objective be
“advanced by means substantially related to that objective.”123 Keep-
ing firearms away from those who would use them to commit
violent crimes is clearly an important objective, but imposing a life-
time firearm ban on Schrader fails to advance that objective. While
a temporary ban on his possession of firearms may have been justi-
fied in 1968, spending forty-five years as a law-abiding citizen dispels
the notion that he currently constitutes a threat to public safety. In
other words, although Schrader was convicted of a violent felony,
he should be able to bring an as-applied challenge to the ban on his
possession of firearms. Schrader should win that challenge, as he
can demonstrate that the ban on his possession of firearms is not
substantially related to public safety; there is no rational reason to
think that his possession of firearms poses a threat to public safety.
CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment does not protect the right of every per-
son in the United States to possess a firearm. However, while “the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,”124 it also
limits how the government may legislate in the interest of public
safety: “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes
certain policy choices off the table.”125 To protect the public against
those who would use firearms to commit acts of violence, legisla-
tures across the country have passed laws prohibiting the possession
of firearms by felons, reasoning that those who have previously bro-
ken the law are likely to do so again. While attempting to serve a
worthy goal, these laws are overreaching.
120. Id.
121. Id., at 983.
122. During which he, presumably, possessed a firearm.
123. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (2010); see also Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
124. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
125. Id. at 636.
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To ensure that prohibited possessor laws remain consistent with
the Second Amendment, any law restricting firearm possession by
non-violent felons should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Fur-
thermore, while bans on firearm possession by violent felons are
facially constitutional, they can be unconstitutional when applied to
certain individuals. These reforms create a framework that allows
legislatures and courts to protect public safety while also acknowl-
edging the Second Amendment and respecting that firearm
possession is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
